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I. INTRODUCTION

After a two-year hiatus, the Florida Legislature resumed its tradition of
regularly restructuring the FloridaJuvenile Code in response to perceived
problems, particularly in Florida's juvenile justice system. The legislature's
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. B.A., 1967, Colgate University; J.D., 1970, Boston College Law School.
The author thanks Raquel M. Chaviano and Daniel S. Weinger for their assistance in the
preparation of this article. This article covers cases decided through June 30, 1997.
1. For a discussion of legislative changes from 1989 through 1996, see Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 Nova L. Rev. 197 (1996) [hereinafter 1996
Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 Nova. L. Rev. 191
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of FloridaLaw,

19 Nova L. Rev. 139 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1993
Leading Cases and Significant Developments in FloridaLaw, 18 Nova L. Rev. 541 (1993)
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primary focus during the 1996-97 session was on removing the delinquency
part II of chapter 39 and rehousing it with its own title in the Florida
Statutes. The second purpose was to reorganize the structure of the
delinquency section of the juvenile code in a way that would be more
logical.2 The result is a new chapter 985, which became effective on
October 1, 1997. The new statute does not have its own title, but the format
has been changed. The changes are discussed briefly in this survey. In
addition, the legislature moved part IV of chapter 39, governing Families in
Need of Services and Children in Need of Services, to chapter 984 and made
several changes to it as well.
This past year, the appellate courts were particularly active in the
delinquency area, both interpreting chapter 39, and holding the trial courts
accountable for compliance with the 1993 and 1994 amendments to the
FloridaJuvenile Code. In light of the legislative changes made in the spring
of 1997, it can be anticipated that the appellate courts will have to parse the
new delinquency law as they have in the past. Interestingly, the courts of
appeal were not as active as they have been in the past in the child welfare
arena. The appellate caseload of dependency and termination of parental
rights cases appears to have been lighter this year, resulting in fewer new
interpretations.
II. DELINQUENCY

A.

Detention Issues

The Florida Legislature has changed its approach to juvenile detention
on a number of occasions over the past twenty years.3 It has recently added
changes to deal with children charged with committing the offense of
domestic violence and children alleged to have violated conditions of

[hereinafter 1993 Leading Cases]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey ofFloridaLaw,
17 Nova L. Rev. 335 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991
Survey ofFloridaLaw, 16 Nova L. Rev. 333 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Survey]; Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 Nova L. Rev. 1169 (1990) [hereinafter 1990
Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law, 14 Nova L. Rev. 859 (1990) [hereinafter Juvenile Law];
Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law, 13 Nova L. Rev. 1159 (1989); see also THE FLORIDA BAR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND PRACIICE (5th ed. 1995).
2. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Juv. Just., HB 1369, Staff Analysis & Final Bill Research Doc. at 2
(Apr. 4, 1997).
3. See 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 190.
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community control or aftercare supervision to the list of children who could
be securely detained.
The Florida pretrial detention statute provides that the determination of
whether a child will be detained securely is based upon the application of a
risk assessment instrument ("RAr"), which in turn is premised upon the
charge against the juvenile.5 If the child scores high enough, the child shall
be securely detained. 6 The statute also provides the court with limited
discretion to detain a child in secure detention when the RAI scoring
threshold would not otherwise be met.7 However, when the court chooses to
override the RAI, it must state clear and convincing reasons in writing why it
is making such a placement! As noted in previous surveys, the trial courts
have not always correctly interpreted the detention requirements.' In D.G.H.
v. Gnat,'0 the State Attorney sought to have the child detained securely by
"aggravating" the RAI score arising from the underlying claim of battery
against a school board employee on school grounds in the presence of other
students." The First District Court of Appeal carefully analyzed the
legislative history and background of the RAI and concluded that the trial
court's authority to order a child held in detention during the pendency of a
delinquency case is limited to the statutory factors prescribed in the law. 2 In
essence, the trial court accepted a bootstrapping argument, which the
appellate court rejected. The state claim was that because the battery was
committed in the presence of other students on school grounds and there was
a resulting disruption of school functions, the RAI computation could be
increased. The appellate court held that all of the RAI points assigned to
the child were attributable to the delinquent act for which he had been
charged and no other reasons compatible with the statutory criteria were
given that would justify a departure. 4 Thus, the lower court had no statutory
by the
discretion to order a placement more restrictive than that indicated
16
15
points scored in the RAI. The appellate court thus reversed.

4. See FLA. STAT. § 985.207(1)(d) (1997) (recodified at §§ 985.213(2)(b)3; 985.215(2)
(1997)).
5. See FLA. STAT. § 39.042(2)(a)1. (1987) (recodified at§ 985.213(2)(a) (1997)).
6. Id. § 39.042(2)(b)1 (recodified at § 985.213(2)(b)(1).
7. Id. § 39.042(2)(b)(3) (recodified at 985.213(2)(b)(3).
8. RA STAT. § 39.044(2)(f) (1995) (recodified at § 985.215(2)(g) (1997)).
9. See 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 190.
10. 682 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.App. 1996).
11. Id. at 211.
12. Id. at213.
13. Id. at 211.
14. Id. at213.
15. D.G.H., 682 So. 2d at 213.
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A similar abuse of discretion occurred in KC. v. Taylor,17 a case in
which the child claimed he was illegally detained based upon a risk
assessment scoring that justified placement only in nonsecure or home
detention. The trial court had ordered him "placed in secure detention with
the proviso that he could be released after 120 hours at the 'counselor's
discretion."' ' 19 The Attorney General's Office candidly admitted that the
detention was illegal and further advised that the same procedure was often
used by the trial courts in the second district. 20 The Second District Court of
Appeal held that use of the RAI is a legislative mandate and the courts must
comply with it. 21 The appellate court then added the following:
We sympathize with the trial court's frustration that, absent clear
and convincing reasons to depart from the placement required by
the risk assessment instrument, the court had no choice but to
release K.C. from secure detention, despite his record of a prior
delinquency and his current charge of using a broken table leg to
menace a teacher. Until the legislature empowers juvenile court
judges with the measure of discretion afforded to criminal court
judges to protect society from its dangerous elements, delinquent
offenders will be released back into society despite a belief by the
juvenile court judge that contrary action is warranted.22
The appellate court's frustration is evident and raises an important
question of whether, and if so, to what degree, discretion in handling
juvenile matters should be placed in the hands of the courts or the
legislature.
The appellate court expressed additional frustration,
commenting that few petitions involving the legality of juvenile detention
raise challenging legal questions.23 Most petitions are pro forma matters in
which the trial court fails to comply with the statutory provisions of chapter
39. 24 As this commentator has written in prior survey articles, and as the
appellate court held in/K C.: "The processing of petitions of obvious merit
such as this one consumes public resources of the public defender's office,

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at214.
696 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 858.
Id.
Id. at 858-59.
Id. at 859.
K C., 696 So. 2d at 859.
Id.
Id.
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the attorney general's office and this court-time which could be better spent
on disputes that are honestly debatable. 25
In TB. v. Wright,26 a juvenile petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging that he could not be held in detention on a charge of burglary
beyond twenty-one days without good cause.27 The trial court detained him,
relying on his prior record and the perceived danger to the community. The
appellate court found that this rationale did not comply with the Florida
statute.28 The ground for extending detention is a delay resulting from a
continuance granted by the court for cause on motion of the child, his or her
counsel, or the state.29 Here, the detention extension was based upon the
original grounds for detention which the appellate court rejected.30
The Florida detention statute also governs post-adjudication and postdisposition detention. 3' In TM v. State,32 a child appealed from the
imposition of a five-day detention period in addition to other penalties
permitted by law after he had been adjudicated delinquent for carrying a
concealed firearm.33 Section 790.22(9)(a) of the FloridaStatutes provides
that a five-day detention period shall be imposed on any juvenile who
commits an offense that involves the use or possession of a firearm. 34 The
juvenile claimed that the statute violated equal protection because an adult
who committed the same offense was not subject to the same mandatory
incarceration period. 35 The Third District Court of Appeal rejected the equal
protection argument on both state and federal constitutional grounds. W It
held first that juveniles and adults are not similarly situated because "the
state's interests in juvenile offenders is vastly different from its interests in
adult offenders."'37 The court also declared that the test for treating the two
groups differently is whether there is a rational basis to do so. 38 Finally, the
court held that the government's objective bore a reasonable relationship to

25. Id
26. 679 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
27. Id at 82.
28. Id at 83.
29. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(5)(d) (1996).
30. TB., 679 So. 2d at 83.
31. FLA. STAT. § 39.044(10)(a)1 (1996) (recodified at § 985.215(10)(a)1 (1997)).
32. 689 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
33. Id at 444.
34. FLA. STAT. § 790.22(9)(a) (1995).
35. TM.,689 So. 2d at 444.
36. Id.
37. Id at445.
38. Id.
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the legitimate state objective of reducing the alarming and escalating number
of firearms in the hands ofjuveniles.39
B.

Adjudicatory Issues

The question of whether charging two fifteen-year-old boys who
engaged in consensual sex with two twelve-year-old girls with statutory rape
violated the boys' right to privacy under the Florida Constitution was before
the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. J.A.S.4 0 The appellate court
upheld the constitutionality of section 800.04, which the State relied upon to
charge the youths.4 1 In so doing, the court did not rely upon the seminal
opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida in T.W. v. State which upheld the
right to privacy for a minor seeking an abortion.43 Rather, the court relied
upon the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in B.B. v. State," and the
legislature's intent in enacting section 800.04. 45 The court concluded that
sexual activity between minors is prohibited whether or not each of the
participants believes he or she consented. 46 Further, the legislature viewed
the problem of consensual sex as serious. 47 Therefore, the statute furthered a
compelling
state interest through the least intrusive means, the test set forth
•
48
in T.W. The problem remaining in the J.A.S. case was whether the penalty
was appropriate. The court held that the trial court had the power to
adjudicate a minor a felon if the situation justified it.49 As a result, it vacated
and remanded.50 However, the court also certified the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance:
WHETHER THE POTENTIAL PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 800.04, FLORIDA STATUTES, BY A MINOR
UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTEEN FURTHERS A COMPELLING

39. Id. at 445-46.

40. 686 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
41. Id.at 1366.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
Id. at 1188.
659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1369.
Id. at 1368.

47. Id. at 1369.

48. TW., 551 So. 2dat 1186.
49. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1369.
50. Id.
at 1366.
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STATE 51
INTEREST THROUGH THE LEAST INTRUSIVE

MEANS.

Juvenile curfew ordinances are a popular political response to the
complicated problems of youth crime. 52 In Cuva v. State,53 an ordinance in
effect in Orlando generated an appellate opinion on a search and seizure
question.54 An Orlando police officer stopped a juvenile because the
appellant was in downtown Orlando after midnight and appeared to be under
eighteen, thus in violation of the city's curfew ordinance. The appellate
court found that the ordinance allowed the police officers to do several
things, including issuing a trespass warning or ordering the juvenile to leave
downtown Orlando. According to the ordinance, "the officers could only
detain... if there was probable cause to believe [the juvenile] was
abandoned, neglected or a threat to himself., 56 The juvenile in the Cuva
case met none of these criteria. Further, violation of the ordinance was
neither a crime nor a noncriminal violation. There was no provision for the
minor to be detained unless it appeared the minor was abandoned, neglected,
or in danger.57 Thus, the ordinancegave the police no authority to detain the
juvenile once he told them his age. The initial contact was consensual, and
after the youngster answered the officer's questions, the officer could not
detain him absent an articulable suspicion that the youngster had committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime. 59 The appellate court
therefore reversed.60
A child who is unable to assist in his or her defense at trial may be
committed to the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") for
residential treatment in order to restore competency. In KD. v. Department
of Juvenile Justice,61 the child claimed, inter alia, that the commitment
statute was unconstitutional because it did not require a psychiatrist to
recommend commitment as provided under the adult involuntary

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id at 1370.
See 1996 Survey, supranote 1, at 207-08.
687 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id at275.
Id at 276.
Id.
Id.
Cuva, 687 So. 2d at 275.
Id. at277.
Id at 274.
694 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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62

commitment statute. The appellate court held that the comparable adult
rule of criminal procedure dealing with incompetent defendants does not
require the appointment of a psychiatrist or the court's receipt of a
psychiatric report in order to commit an adult defendant found to be
incompetent to proceed.6 3 Thus, the juvenile offender and the adult criminal
of
defendant are treated similarly for purposes of the determination
64
incompetency, and the court therefore affirmed the commitment.
A First Amendment student's rights case was recently decided by the
Third District Court of Appeal in MC. v. State.65 A middle school student in
Dade County was arrested as a result of disruptive activities, including an
intentionally loud tirade and protest in the school's office resulting from the
arrest of her brother on the battery of a police officer. The juvenile was
charged in a one count petition of delinquency for violation of the Florida
statute A overning disruption and interference with the operation of
schools. She moved to dismiss the delinquency petition on the grounds
that it was facially unconstitutional in violation of free speech, overbreadth,
and vagueness. 67 The district court upheld the statute in all respects. 68 The
court rejected the free speech claim relying both on state and federal
constitutional case law.69 In L.A. T.v. State,u the Third District Court of
Appeal had reversed a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for disorderly
conduct based upon the child's screaming obscenities to police officers who
were arresting the juvenile's friend in a shopping center parking lot.71 The
court distinguished the MC. situation, finding that a school setting is
Furthermore, the court
entirely different from an open public setting.
73
relied upon Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
which held that the key question was whether the forbidden conduct or
expression "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others. 74 The court held that the Florida statute did

62. Id. at 818; see also
(1997)).

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.0517 (Supp. 1996) (recodified at § 985.223

63. KD., 694 So. 2d at 818; see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.212 (1995).

64. KD., 694 So. 2d at 818.
65. 695 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
66. See FLA. STAT. § 877.13 (1995).
67. M.C., 695 So. 2d at 478.
68. Id. at 484.
69. Id. at 480-81.

70. 650 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
71. Id.at215-17.

72. Id. at 217.
73. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
74. Id. at513.
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not violate the First Amendment under Tinker because its intended purpose
was to prevent only expression or conduct which materially disrupts or
interferes with normal school functions or activities.75
In G.RA. v. State,76 a child appealed a disposition which, inter alia,
placed the child on community control for one year after withholding
adjudication. 77 The appellate court held that the relevant statute specifies the
dispositional powers of the trial court when it has jurisdiction over an
adjudicated child under which circumstances the commitment may not
exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which an adult could serve for
the same offense.78 However, nothing in the statute covers a court's
dispositional powers when the adjudication is withheld. Despite this fact,
the appellate court held that the trial court should not be allowed to impose a
penalty harsher than that permitted for an adjudicated delinquent or an adult
offender. 79 Therefore, the court reduced the commitment to the time
established for an adjudicated delinquent or adult.80
In P. W.G. v. State,8 ' one of the issues on appeal was whether the court
could enter an order of disposition placing a child in a high risk level facility
specializing in treatment of adolescent sexual offenders based upon a report
that included a judgment based upon the child's prior uncharged criminal
activity. 2 The court of appeal stated that there was no due process violation
in making that decision.8 The due process analysis contained in In re
Gault8 4 dealt only with procedural due process.35 It did not address
substantive due process rights.86 Because the purposes of the juvenile and
adult criminal justice processes are different, the court held that it was
constitutionally permissible for the trial court to impose whatever treatment
plan it concluded was most likely to be effective for the particular child as
long as it did "not pose a significant threat to the health or well-being of the
child. 87

75. MC., 695 So. 2d at 481.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

688 So. 2d 1027 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id at 1027.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(4) (1996).
G.RA., 688 So. 2d at 1028.
Id at 1028-29.
682 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. lst Dist Ct. App. 1996).

82. Id at 1204.

83. Id at 1206-08.

84. 387 U.S. 1(1967).
85. P. W.G., 682 So. 2d at 1207.
86. Id.

87. Id at 1208.
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Right to Counsel Issues

The right to counsel is a basic precept of the juvenile court system
emanating from In re Gault.8 Florida provides for counsel by statute and
8 9 Rule 8.165
under the FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure.
sets forth the
obligation of the court to provide counsel and the grounds under which the
child may waive counsel. 90 Periodically, the trial courts either fail to
appoint counsel or advise juveniles of the right to a lawyer. 91 In N.R.L.v.
State,92 an adjudicatory
order was entered following the child's uncontested
93
plea to grand theft. The child was not represented by counsel when he
entered his plea, and the appellate court found that no thorough inquiry was
made into the juvenile's desire to waive the right to counsel as required by
Rule 8.165(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.94 The court
reversed, finding that the child must be advised of the right to counsel, and,
if he chooses to waive counsel, the95 court must determine whether the waiver
was freely and intelligently made.
If a child indicates a desire to waive counsel, the court must ensure by
"thorough inquiry" that the waiver is freely and intelligently made. 96 In
D.VL. v. State, the Second District Court of Appeal analyzed the
proposition that a plea be knowing and voluntary. 98 In D.VL., the trial court
never determined that the plea was entered "voluntarily and with an
understanding of the nature of the allegations," and the possible
consequences of such plea, and that there is a factual basis for such plea. 99
The appellate court found that the "plea colloquy was woefully
'
inadequate," 100
and thus reversed and remanded.' 0 1
The right to a speedy trial, based upon rights secured by the Sixth
Amendment in adult cases, 1 2 also applies in juvenile delinquency cases. In

88. Gault,387 U.S. at 42.
89. FLA. STAT. § 39.041 (1995); FLA.R. Juv. P. 8.165.
90. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165.
91. See 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 342-45.
92. 684 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
93. Id.at 299.
94. Id.
95. Id.at 300.
96. Interest of D.L.A., 667 So. 2d 330, 331 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
97. 693 So. 2d 693 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
98. Id.at 694.
99. Id.; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.075.
100. D. V.L., 693 So. 2d at 694.
101. Id.
102. -arker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972).
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10 4
PJ.A. v. Foster,10 3 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the right.
the State appealed from an order granting a
Recently, in State v. .W,
motion to dismiss a delinquency petition based upon a speedy trial violation
claiming that the State could file outside the ninety-day speedy trial period
based upon a fifteen-day "window of recapture period" provided by the
06
The court held that the rule does not
FloridaRules ofJuvenile Procedure.1
allow the State to file a delinquency petition after the ninety day period has
already expired. 10 7 In the case at bar, the speedy trial period expired one day
before the charges were filed against the child. 18 Because the State was not
entitled to file the charges against the child beyond the ninety day period, it
could not avail itself of the recapture period.10 9
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided a very important case
regarding the constitutional rights of children in public schools. In New
Jersey v. T.L. 0.,11° the Court established the standard for search and seizure
of reasonable suspicion as opposed
by a school official,111holding that it is one112
In J.A.P v. State, a child was adjudicated to have
to probable cause.
committed the offenses of possession of a firearm on school grounds,
carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm by a minor.113 The
child argued, inter alia, that the hand gun seized from his person on the first
day of school by a deputy sheriff in the presence of an assistant principal
should have been suppressed. When a teacher learned that the juvenile
might have the weapon, the official called the school resource officer, who
was a deputy sheriff assigned to the school. 114 The deputy performed a patdown and felt the holstered pistol in the boy's waist band. The significant
issue was the involvement of the deputy sheriff, who as a police officer,
generally needs to have probable cause to search, as opposed to the assistant
principal, who needed merely reasonable suspicion to interrogate and search
under T.L.O. 115 The court held first that because the child was carrying a
gun on his person in the classroom during the school day, either a school

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
"115.

603 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1992); see also 1992 Survey, supranote 1, at 347.
Id at 1171-72.
679 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id.; see FLA. R Juv. P. 8.090G).
TW., 679 So. 2d at 70.
Id.
Id.
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id at341.
689 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id at 1243.
Id
Id.
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official or a police officer needed only have reasonable suspicion to conduct
the inquiry because the inquiry was in the nature of a "Terry stop," referring
to the Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio.1 6 The court further held, in
an apparent expansion of T.L.O., that as a general proposition, a school
official who has reasonable suspicion that a student is carrying a dangerous
weapon may request any police officer to perform a pat-down search and
that the involvement of the police officer will not violate the student's
Fourth Amendment right or require probable cause for such a search. 1 7 The
court's rationale was:
It would be foolhardy and dangerous to hold that a teacher or
school administrator, who often is untrained in firearms, can search
a child reasonably suspected of carrying a gun or other dangerous
weapon at school only if the teacher or administrator does not
involve the
8 school's trained resource officer or some other police
officer."

In addition, the court reasoned that courts have held that random
suspicionless administrative searches have19 been approved because of the
danger of students carrying such weapons.
In a second case, A.S. v. State, the Second District Court of Appeal
applied the two-part T.L.O. standard: That the search is grounded in
reasonable suspicion if it is justified at its inception, and that it is reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the search in the first
place.' 21 In A.S., the assistant principal saw a group of boys huddled
together, one of the students with money in his hand, and the appellant
fiddling in his pocket. The official could see no contraband, and thus the
court held the search was not justified at its inception. 122 The court also held
that because the student was fiddling with his
23 pockets, the search of his
backpack and wallet was unreasonable as well.1

116. Id at 1244 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and relying upon New York case
law cited in In re Gregory M., 627 N.E.2d 500, 502 (N.Y. 1993)).
117. J.A.R., 689 So. 2d at 1244.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing State v. J.A., 679 So: 2d 316 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
120. 693 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
121. Id. at 1095 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985)).
122. Id.
at 1096.
123. Id.
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D. DispositionalIssues

The dispositional alternatives available in the FloridaJuvenile Code
include restitution, community control, and commitment to various facilities
operated either directly or under contract by the Department of Juvenile
Justice ("DJJ"). 24 Although the suggestion has been made previously in this
survey that the dispositional statute is not particularly complex, 2 5 the
appellate courts continue to rule primarily on rather mundane and repetitious
issues of error by the trial courts. For example, section 39.052(4) of the
Florida Statutes governs the procedures for disposition, and section
39.052(4)(e)1. specifically states:
If the court determines that the child should be adjudicated as
having committed a delinquent act and should be committed to the
department, such determination shall be in writing or on the record
of the hearing. The determination shall include a specific finding of
the reasons for the26decision to adjudicate and to commit the child
to the department.1
In KY.L. and N.L. v. State,127 the trial court gave no reason for its
commitment decision as to one child and, as to the other, the court erred by
relying on the child's lack of contrition or remorse to place the child. 12 Lack of contrition or remorse is a constitutionally impermissible
consideration in imposing sentence, as at least three earlier appellate court
decisions have held. 129 In J.M. v. State,'" the State conceded that the trial
31
court erred in failing to make the requisite findings and the court reversed.
The same problem has arisen regularly with regard to the trial court's
obligation to enter a written order when it imposes an adult sentence, as
opposed to a juvenile disposition, when the child has been tried as an

124. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(l)(a) (1995).
125. See 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 197.
126. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(e)l. (1996).

127. 685 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct App. 1997).
128. Id, at 1381.
129. Id (citing A.S. v. State, 667 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Holton v. State,
573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 960 (1991); Hubler v. State, 458 So. 2d 350
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
130. 692 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
131. Id at 308; see also 1996 Survey, supranote 1, at 198-99; K.M.T. v. State, 695 So. 2d
1309, 1310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); J.RC. v. State, 696 So. 2d 822, 822 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that the court must specify its reasons in writing or on the record of the
hearing).
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adult. 132 Prior to October 1, 1994, the Florida Legislature required trial
courts to make specific, detailed written findings justifying the imposition of
the adult sentence. 133 Now, the court need only make a written order of the
decision to impose adult sanctions.134 In four reported decisions, Culliver v.
State,135 McBride v. State,'136 Ledbetter v. State,137 and Brown v. State,'13 the
courts of appeal reversed
for failure to enter a written order as provided by
139
the revised statute.
A relatively new form of disposition under Florida law is a fifteen day
secure detention placement pending transfer to the Department of Juvenile
Justice for commitment.140 In P.E.D. v. Gnat, 141 the First District Court of
Appeal was faced with the question of whether the fifteen day limitation
applied to a juvenile who was going to be placed in a high or maximum risk
facility operated by DJJ. 14 2 The State argued that the fifteen day limitation
on secure detention pending placement applied only to juveniles awaiting
placement in lower to moderate risk residential programs, and that there was
no limitation on those awaiting placement in a high risk program. 143 The
appellate court agreed and found that the more specific provision of the
section controls, and because it placed
44 no time limit on secure detention, the
continued confinement was lawful.
In C.H. v. Makemson, 145 a second case that interpreted the
post-disposition secure detention statute, the question was how many days a
child may be ordered into secure detention for violating the terms of home
detention care with electronic monitoring while awaiting a moderate risk
placement.146 The court ordered the child placed in secure detention for 14ten
8
days. 147 The child argued that the maximum placement was five days.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
(1997)).
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1995); see also 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 202-03.
FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1993) (amended by FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1994)).
FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1995).
693 So. 2d 1152, 1152 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
695 So. 2d 405, 405 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
692 So. 2d 257,257 (Fla.1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
692 So. 2d 987, 987-88 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1995).
See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(10)(a)1 (Supp. 1996) (recodified at § 985.215 (10(a)l
681 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 848.
Id. at 849.
Id.
692 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at303.
Id.
Id.
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The court agreed with the child's interpretation of the statute and granted the
writ of habeas corpus. 49
When a child has been found to have committed a delinquent act and
the court considers its disposition of the case, "the court [must] consider a
pre-disposition report regarding the suitability of the child for disposition
other than by adjudication and commitment to [DJJ].' 150 The dispositional
report results from a multidisciplinary assessment, if needed and a
"classification and placement process" with recommendations.1yi Trial
courts seem to have had difficulty interpreting their responsibilities in
reviewing and evaluating the DJJ recommendation. For example, in RD. v.
State,152 the DJJ prepared a predisposition report recommending community
control but the court rejected it.
On appeal, the First District Court of
Appeal found that the trial court rejected the recommendation and imposed a
high risk commitment without first securing another recommendation from
DJJ as to the restrictiveness level which the statute required. 154 The court
relied upon earlier opinions in S.R v. State,155 and K YL. & N.L. v. State,' 56
of which held that the court must receive and consider a recommendation
157
from the DJJ as to restrictiveness level before ordering a commitment.
Apparently, the courts were interpreting 8the statute to require a second
recommendation after the initial rejection. '
In T.M.B. v. State,'59 the trial court disregarded DJJ's pre-disposition
report recommendation and gave no reason for its decision. 6 Because it
failed to articulate its rationale, the appellate court reversed. 161 Thus, the
trial court's departure from a DJJ recommendation is appealable. 162
Of course, the trial court does have the power to deviate from the DJJ's
recommended commitment level. 163 Section 39.052(4)(e)3 of the Florida

149. Id.
150. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(a) (Supp. 1996).
151. Id.

152. 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1235 (1st Dist. Ct. App. May 13, 1997).
153. Id. atD1235.

154. Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

683 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
685 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
1RD. v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1235 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. May 13, 1997).
See LP.M. v. State, 688 So. 2d 458, 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.App. 1997).
689 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id at 1216.
Id.
J.M. v. State, 677 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
See 1996 Survey, supranote 1, at 200.
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Statutes governs the process whereby the court may disagree with the DJJ
placement recommendation. 64 The statute provides:
The court shall commit the child to the department at the
restrictiveness level identified or may order placement at a
different restrictiveness level. The court shall state for the record
the reasons which establish by a preponderance of the evidence
why the court is disregarding the assessment of the child and the
restrictiveness level recommended by the department. Any party
may appeal the court's findings resulting in a modified level of
restrictiveness pursuant to this subparagraph. 65
The issue in R.L.B. v. State166 was whether the court could deviate from
the recommended commitment level by placing the child at the high risk
restrictiveness level when there was no high risk program available.'
The
appellate court held that the trial court acted within its authority when it
6 What the
assigned the juvenile to the specific restrictiveness level . 168
court
cannot do, according to Florida case law, is choose a particular placement
for the child. The First District Court of Appeal noted that the ultimate
resolution lay in the legislature to provide an appropriate placement, but
1 70
nonetheless, the statute gave the appellate court the power to set that level.
Finally, in R.D.S. v. State,171 a child appealed from a dispositional order
disregarding DJJ's minimum risk placement recommendation based upon the
court's observation of the child.172 The court found the child's body
language offensive to the court because it was disrespectful and
contemptuous. 73 The appellate court held that lack of contrition or remorse
is not sufficient to overcome the burden placed upon the trial court when it
disregards placement recommendations.
The extent to which a juvenile court can impose "moral" and "spiritual"
training was before the First District Court of Appeal in MC.L. v.

164. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(4)(e)3 (Supp. 1996).
165. Id.
166. 693 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
167. Id. at 131.
168. Id.at 131-32.
169. Id. at 131 (citing H.R.S. v. State, 616 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
170. Id.
171. 696 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
172. dat 1189.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing K.Y.L. v. State, 685 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) and AS. v.
State, 667 So. 2d 994 (FIa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
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State.175 The child challenged the order on both state and federal
constitutional grounds. 176 The court held that the imposition of moral
training did not violate either the federal or Florida constitutional provisions
relating to free exercise of religion, but that the spiritual training portion was
unconstitutional. 177 The court concluded that the moral training bore a
relationship to the crime for which the juvenile had been adjudicated and
reasonably related to future criminality. 178 Finally, the First District Court of
Appeal upheld the trial court's order that the mother participate with her
child in fulfilling the court ordered sanction. 179 The court held that the order
as to the mother was within the dispositional power expressly granted to the
court by statute. 80
Another dispositional alternative is community control, known in other
jurisdictions as probation. The contours of this dispositional alternative
continue to evade the grasp of the trial courts. Nine reported opinions by
the courts of appeal are illustrative of the kinds of problems that arise. In
JS. v. State,lsr the trial court, as a condition of community control,
instructed the child to stay away from "negative peers."' 1 2 The Third
on the grounds that the description was too
District Court of Appeal 8reversed
3
vague to be enforceable.1
Section 39.054 of the Florida Statutes governs the placement on
community control. Subpart 4 provides as follows:
Any commitment of a delinquent child to the Department of
Juvenile Justice must be for an indeterminant period of time... but
the time may not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment that
an adult may serve for the same offense ....[A] child may not be
held under a commitment from a court pursuant to this section after
becoming 21 years of age.184
Thus, the statute clearly provides that commitment and community
control shall be limited to the maximum adult sentence or to the date of the
juvenile's nineteenth birthday, whichever happens first.

175. 682 So. 2d 1209, 1209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
176. Idat 1210.
177. Idat 1212.
178. Id at 1213.
179. Idat 1214.
180. MC.L., 682 So.2d at 1214.
181. 691 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
182. Idat20.
183. Id(citing McCord v. State, 679 So. 2d 32, 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
184. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(4) (1995).
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In C.P. v. State,I" the court committed a child on a third degree felony,
punishable by imprisonment not to exceed five years, to community control
for an indeterminant period exceeding five years. 186 The appellate court
reversed and remanded with instructions to the lower court to clarify the
order to place the child on community control for an indeterminate term not
to exceed five years."' In MS. v. State, 18 the State conceded sentencing
error and the court remanded based upon the C.P. opinion.18 9 In V.
v.
State,19° the trial court placed the child on community control until the
child's nineteenth birthday based upon an adjudication of a first degree
misdemeanor. 191 The maximum sentence for a first degree misdemeanor for
an adult is one year in county jail or community control.192 In light of the
disposition for more than the period an adult would
193 face, the appellate court
vacated the sentence and the case was remanded.
However, in MB. v. State, 194 after a child was found to have committed
one count of battery, the court withheld adjudication and placed the child on
community control under Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
supervision for an indeterminate period. 195 The court of appeal held that
because the child was not "adjudicated" for purposes of chapter 39,196 his
case was governed by a separate section of the Florida Statutes: Section
39.053.197 Under this law, the restrictions relating
to community control and
198
comparisons to adult sanctions do not apply.
A more technical matter came before the court in C.L. v. State.'99
Among the issues the child raised on appeal was the failure of the court to
announce seventy-five hours of community service at the sentencing.200 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the conditions of
185. 674 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
186. Id. at 1184.
187. Id.
188. 695 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
189. Id. at 891 (citing C.P. v. State, 674 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1996)).
190. 693 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
191. Id. at723.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing G.R.A. v. State, 688 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)); see also
1994 Survey, supranote 1, at 154; 1992 Survey, supranote 1,at 358; 1991 Survey, supra note 1,
at 351 n.112; 1990 Survey, supranote 1, at 1185; Juvenile Law, supranote 1,at 877.
194. 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
195. Id. at 1066.
196. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1) (1993) (repealed 1997).
197. M.B., 693 So. 2d at 1067.
198. Id.
199. 693 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
200. Id. at715.
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community control need not be orally pronounced at the sentencing. 2 0 1 In
another technical holding, J.KN. v. State,2 02 a child appealed a final order of
disposition that he violated the community control disposition by failing to
attend school. 203 The appellate court reversed, finding that the evidence at
the violation hearing did not establish that anyone had instructed the child to
attend school. 20 4 Apparently, existence of an order alone did not suffice.
One of the common conditions of community control is regular school
attendance with no unexcused absences. In a series of consolidated appeals
205
in F.A. T. v. State, the juveniles claimed the affidavits alleging violation of
community control were based upon "confidential and inadmissible
computer-generated school attendance records impermissibly obtained and
[employed] by the state attorney's office in violation of [Florida law]. 20 6
Specifically at issue was section 228.093 of the Florida Statutes which
governs privacy of school records and the state constitutional right to
privacy. 20 7 The appellate court first found that the attendance records,
consisting of records of absences and an absence and warning summary from
the school system were covered by the statute, and thus, not subject to
public disclosure.1°8 The court then found that none of the statutory
exceptions to nondisclosure applied. 0 9 One of the exceptions to the
disclosure rule involves using the records to determine the appropriate
programs and services for juveniles and their families. 2 10 Therefore, the use
of such records
211 is admissible in a dispositional hearing but not in any prior
proceedings.
The court held that a contempt proceeding is neither a
dispositional nor a post-dispositional hearing.2 12 To the contrary, the act of
indirect criminal contempt constitutes a delinquent act. The contempt
proceeding, therefore, is not a post-dispositional proceeding. 3 For that
reason, the records were held inadmissible.214

201. Id (citing A.B.C. v. State, 682 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1996)).
202. 691 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct App. 1997).
203. Id at 1169.
204. Id.
205. 690 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
206. Id. at 1348.
207. Id (citing Fla. Stat § 220.093 (1995)).
208. Id at 1349.
209. Id. at 1350.
210. F.A.T, 690 So. 2d at 1350.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id at 13501351.
214. Id.
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The appropriate application of Florida's restitution statute continues to
create problems for the trial courts.2 15 The Supreme Court of Florida, in
J. O.S. v. State,216 recently resolved one significant issue: Whether, in the
absence of a plea agreement, restitution could be ordered in an amount
greater than the maximum dollar figure defining the offense for which the
child had been adjudicated. 217 The Supreme Court of Florida answered the
question in the affirmative. 21 The court first reiterated that damage must be
caused by the charged offense before it would be subject to an order of
restitution in a juvenile proceeding.219 Specifically, the damage must bear a
significant relationship to the convicted offense. 220 Next, the court compared
the juvenile restitution situation to that of an adult criminal defendant and
22
applied the same test it had previously applied to adults in Hebert v. State. 1
In the adult case, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that a trial court could
order restitution that exceeded the amount defined by the maximum dollar
value of the offense when a plea agreement expressly left the amount of
restitution to the discretion of the trial court.222 The only difference between
the Hebert case and the case at bar was the issue of whether discretion ought
to be afforded in the absence of an express agreement leaving the amount of
the restitution to the court's discretion.
This question had been explicitly
left undecided in Hebert.224 The court concluded in JO.S. that so long as the
amount of damage bore a substantial relationship to what would be the
conviction if the child were an adult, the court could order restitution in an
amount greater than the maximum dollar value defining the offense for
which the child was adjudicated.22 5
In CM v. State, the grandmother and legal guardian were ordered to
pay restitution to the victim of the child's theft.227 The appellate court held
that the order explicitly violated the Florida statute governing restitution

215. See 1995 Survey, supranote 1, at 199E200.
216. 689 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1997).
217. Id. at 1062.
218. Id.
219. Id.at 1063 (citing Fla. Stat. § 775.089(1)(a) (Supp. 1994)).
220. Id. at 1064 (citing J.S.H. v. State, 472 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1985)).
221. JO.S., 689 So. 2d at 1064 (citing Herbert v. State, 614 So. 2d 493, 494 (Fla. 1993)).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1065.
226. 676 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also J.T. v. State, 680 So. 2d 564,
564 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996); M.C.L. v. State, 682 So. 2d 1209, 1214 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
227. Id.
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orders.228 Section 39.054(1)(f) of the FloridaStatutes provides that a court
imposing restitution at disposition has three alternatives: 1) ordering the
child to make restitution in money; 2) ordering the child to make restitution
in kind; or 3) ordering the child to make restitution through a promissory
note, cosigned by the child's parent or guardian, providing that the parent or
guardian had failed to establish he or she had made a diligent effort to
prevent the child from engaging in the delinquent acts.2 29 The court found
that the trial court did not use any of these alternatives, but instead simply
imposed direct liability upon the grandmother. 230 The appellate court
reversed. 231
Under Florida law, the parent can be ordered 23toz pay a fee for the
In C.M v. State,2 3
services rendered to the child by the Public Defender.
the trial court ordered the child's guardian to pay $250 to the City of
Jacksonville for services rendered to the child by the Public
Defender.3 4 However, it was undisputed that the guardian, the child's
grandmother, was not afforded either notice of intent to seek such a fee from
her or an opportunity to contest its amount. Therefore, the appellate court
reversed. 235
Florida law also provides that when the court enters an order of
restitution as part of community control, the amount23623
may not exceed an
amount the child could reasonably be expected to earn.
In AJ v. State,2 37
a fifteen-year-old pleaded guilty to aggravated battery, which resulted in a
restitution order to the victim's parents and a separate amount to the
insurance company2 3 Because there was no record of evidence of what the
child could reasonably be expected to earn, and because the trial court made
no such finding, there was no basis for the conclusion that the child could
pay the 240
amount ordered in restitution. The court of appeal therefore
reversed.

228. Id at 499.

229. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(o (1995) (repealed 1997).
230. C.M., 676 So. 2d at 499.
231. Id.
232. See FLA. STAT. § 39.041(2) (1995) (recodified at § 985.203(2) (1997)); see also 1994
Survey, supra note 1, at 146; 1993 Leading Cases, supranote 1, at 557; 1992 Survey, supra note
1, at 3701374.
233. 676 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
234. Id at 499.
235. Id at 498.
236. FLA. STAT. § 39.054(I)(a)1 (1995) (repealed 1997).
237. 677 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
238. aIdat 936.
239. Id. at 938.
240. Id
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A case clearly demonstrating a waste of appellate resources is T.S. v.
State.24' In that case, the trial court adjudicated two juveniles delinquent and
ordered restitution in the amount of $11,874.75.242 The problem was that the
court failed to clarify each child's responsibility for the single restitution
amount. Apparently, the trial court orally announced that the appellants
were each responsible, jointly and severally, with another codefendant for
$9,265.50."4 The two appellants were each also responsible, jointly and
severally, for the remaining $2,609.25.244 The appellate court remanded to
the trial court so that it could put the oral pronouncements in writing.241
In J.K v. State,246 a child who had entered a plea of guilty to burglary
247
appealed from the amount of restitution for the loss of a cellular phone.
The trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $690.25, constituting
twenty-five cents for the cost of the phone and $690 for the victim's
remaining obligation on the contract.248 The appellate court reversed based
upon its determination that the award over compensated the victim.49 The
appellate court did recognize that a restoration award could take into account
"consideration that the timing of repayment may cause the victim to suffer
additional loss. ' ' 25° However, the facts here were that the award of $690.25
for the contract alone over compensated the victim for his loss. Had the
victim been unable to use the telephone, he could have canceled the contract
and been obligated to pay only $400. As the court said, "[r]estitution [does]
not abandon the concept of mitigation of damages. ' 251
A similar miscalculation of restitution took place in B.D.A. v. State.
In that case, the dispositional order resulted from the child's adjudication for
having made false bomb reports to school officials necessitating evacuation
of the school building. 2" The restitution order included assessment for the
salaries of
staff for each
of theservices
days involved
.2544 However,
the
teachers
andschool
staff continued
to perform
and received
their regular

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

693 So. 2d 119 (FIa. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id.
Id.
695 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.at 869.
Id.
Id.at 870.
Id.
J.K., 695 So. 2d at 870.
695 So. 2d 399 (FIa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 399.
Id.
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salary.25 5 Thus, there was no damage or loss caused by the offense. The
Florida statute does not provide for compelled restitution under these
circumstances.256
Finally, restitution orders must be made while the court has
jurisdiction. In MC.L. v. State,25 7 the trial court held a hearing on restitution
after the child's notice of appeal was filed. 25 Therefore, the order imposing
restitution was without effect for lack of jurisdiction despite the fact that the
judge attempted to reserve jurisdiction to consider restitution.2 11 On the
other hand, in C.A. v. State,260 the trial court reserved jurisdiction within
sixty days of the sentence, as required by Florida law, 261 having accepted a
plea agreement in which the State reserved restitution and the trial court
orally stated that it was reserving jurisdiction. 262 While the written order did
not conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement, the appellate court held
that the oral pronouncement prevailed over the written form. 263 There had
been no loss ofjurisdiction similar to that which occurred in M.C.L.2
E.

Appeals

The issue of a right of appeal for a juvenile who is indigent, although
States Supreme Court in In re Gault, is provided
not decided by •the
265
• United
by statute in Florida.
The counsel statute includes the appointment of the
public defender for purposes of appeal for an indigent juvenile defendant. 266
An important issue was before the First District Court of Appeal in ZF. v.
State.
The question before the court was whether a child had a right to a
public defender on appeal where the parents were not indigent and did not
wish to appeal on the child's behalf.2 The appellate court held that under
section 27.52(2)(d) of the Florida Statutes, the court has the power to

255. Id.
256. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(f) (Supp. 1996).
257. 682 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
258. Id at 1214.
259. Id See Nguyen v. State, 655 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Skaggs v.
State, 620 So. 2d 1304 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
260. 685 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
261. Id at 1037. See FLA. STAT. § 775.089 (1995).
262. CA., 685 So. 2d at 1037.
263. Id.
264. MC.L., 682 So. 2d at 1209.
265. See FLA STAT. § 39.069(1) (1985) (recodified at § 985.234(1) (1997)).
266. See FLA. STAT. § 27.51 (Supp. 1996).
267. 683 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
268. Id at 1084.
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appoint the Office of the Public Defender or a private attorney to represent a
youth on appeal if the nonindigent parent or guardian will not employ
counsel. 2 69 However, in order to do so, the appeal must be necessary. 271 The
It
court established a test for determining necessary legal services.
concluded that when the parents are nonindigent, the court should obtain the
opinions of the trial attorney and the parents as to whether an appeal would
involve necessary legal services.2 72 Should the court have any doubts, it
should remove the parents as the decision maker on the issue and appoint a
Should the court determine that the appeal involves
guardian ad litem.
274
If the
necessary legal services, an attorney should then be appointed.
court, on the other hand, finds the case does275not constitute necessary legal
services, it should decline to appoint counsel.
F.

Legislative and Rules Changes

For several years, the Juvenile Justice Advisory Board 27 6 has been
pressing the Florida Legislature to make changes in part II of chapter 39
dealing with juvenile delinquency by providing it with its own title and then
reorganizing it.277 This year, the legislature responded by passing chapter
97-238.278 The resulting chapter 985 did not altogether accomplish the
advisory board's purpose because part II of chapter 39 has been moved, not
within title XLVII which governs
to a new title, but to a new chapter
"criminal procedure and corrections." 279 The delinquency part of chapter 39
had been in title V which is entitled "Judicial Branch., 280 When the
delinquency provisions were in the judicial branch section they followed
269. Id. at 1085.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. ZF., 683 So. 2d at 1085.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See FLA. STAT. § 39.003 (Supp. 1996) (establishing and governing the operation of
the Juvenile Justice Advisory Board). The Board's duties are set forth in section 39.003(4) of the
FloridaStatutes.
277. Telephone Interview with Timothy Center, Esq., Staff Member, Juvenile Justice
Advisory Board (Sept. 10, 1997).
278. Chapter 9713238 resulted from House Bill 1369 which originated within the
Department of Juvenile Justice and was amended to include SB 2086, the Juvenile Justice
Advisory Board's technical rewrite of chapter 39. See 1997 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 9713238

(West).
279. FLA. STAT. tit. XLVII (1996).
280. FLA. STAT. tit. V (1996).
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chapters governing the functions of the supreme court, circuit courts, county
courts, and district courts of appeal. The delinquency provisions are now
found in the criminal procedure and corrections sections after chapters
relating to youthful offenders and victim assistance and crime in general.28 1
Placement of the delinquency provisions, as they are currently written under
either title, makes little structural sense.28 2 The simplest approach would
have been to take chapter 39 in its entirety and reproduce it as a single
juvenile code with its own title.
The second purpose of the legislative move to chapter 985 was to
reorganize the statute in a more comprehensible fashion.28 3 Whether the new
format is more logical remains to be seen. It may be that some unintended
284
But at the very
substantive changes in the law resulted from the change.
least, practitioners and appellate courts will have to cross-reference case law
from the old chapter 39 to the new chapter 985 provisions. Finally, the new
law does contain some substantive changes which were attached to the law
by the legislature late in the session, although the intent of the Juvenile
Justice Advisory Board had
285 been to make no changes in the law except to
replace and reorganize it.
For example, as part of its change from chapter 39 to chapter 985, the
legislature amended the law regarding detention of children charged with
domestic violence by providing that the court shall make written findings
that form the basis for holding the child in detention.286 The law had
provided that a child could be held in secure detention for up to forty-eight
hours prior to a hearing under certain circumstances. 287 The legislature
amended the statute to provide that the child could continue to be held in
secure detention if the court made specific written findings that it was
281.

FLA. STAT.

§§ 39.05913958.04 (1997).

282. At least chapter 39 had been in the same place for several years. Part of the problem
is that the Florida Juvenile Code contains both court procedure provisions and agency
operational provisions. The sections ofthe code governing the operation of agencies like DJJ and
DCF should be moved to separate sections of the law specifically related to those agencies.
283. According to DJJ, the current structure of chapter 39 is illogically organized, which
causes confusion and inconsistency in its application. The Juvenile Justice Advisory Board has
recommended that the Florida Legislature remove the current provisions of the statute relating to
delinquency and children in need of services ("CINS") and families in need of services ("FINS")
matters from chapter 39 and place them in separate chapters of the statute. Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Juv. Just., HB 1369, StaffAnalysis & Final Research Doe. at 2 (Apr. 4, 1997).
284. According to the Department of Juvenile Justice, there were to be no substantive
changes except those explicitly made by the legislature. See Department Of Juvenile Justice,
1997 Legislative Session WrapBjp at 3 (1997).
285. See Telephone Interview with Timothy Center, Esq., supranote 206.
286. See FLA. STAT. § 985.213(2)(b)(3) (1997).
287. See FLA. STAT. § 39.044(7) (1995).
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necessary to protect the victim from further injury, but that under no
circumstances might the child be held in secure detention beyond the time
limits set forth in section 39.044."' The second and more significant change
in the detention criteria provides that a child who is alleged to have violated
the conditions of community control or aftercare supervision may be
detained, but that detainment
must be in what FloridaStatutes refer to as a
"consequence unit.' , 289
It can be expected that the FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure will be
amended to reflect the transfer of the delinquency section of chapter 39 to
chapter 985 as well as the substantive changes. In the fall of 1996, the
Supreme Court of Florida made several changes to the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure in two significant respects. First, the discovery rules,
both in adult felony cases and in juvenile cases, were changed to limit the
use of depositions. There are now three categories of witnesses subject to
deposition. In category A, the individual is subject to deposition under the
former rules.
Category B witnesses are subject to deposition upon leave
of court upon a showing of good cause, and, absent a showing that a
Category C witness has been improperly designated, such witness cannot be
deposed.291 Category A witnesses are eye witnesses, alibi and rebuttal
witnesses, those present when a recorded or unrecorded statement was made,
investigating officers, witnesses known by the prosecutors that have material
information to negate guilt, child hearsay witnesses, and experts who have
292
not provided a written report or curriculum vitae but are going to testify.
In addition, the limitation on the use of depositions in juvenile cases will
now be the same as that in adult cases wherein depositions are restricted
293 in
cases in which only a misdemeanor or traffic offense has been alleged.
In separate amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure,
also in the fall of 1996, the Supreme Court of Florida authorized substantial
redrafting of the procedures when a child is believed to be incompetent or

288. Section 39.044 was recodified at section 985.215 and provides that a child may not be
held in secure detention for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing has been
commenced by the court. See FLA. STAT. § 985.215(5)(b) (1997).
289. Section 985.231(1)(a)1.c. (1997) provides that: "[a] consequence unit is a secure
facility specifically designated by the department for children who are taken into custody... for
violating community control or aftercare, or who have been found by the court to have violated
the conditions of community control or aftercare." FLA. STAT. § 985.231(a)1.c. (1997).
290. See In re Amendment to Fla. Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(h) and Fla. Rule of
Juvenile Procedure 8.060(d), 681 So. 2d 666, 684 (Fla. 1996).
291. Id. at 684.
292. Id. at 682.
293. Id. at 685; see also Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.060(d)(2)(I).
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insane at the time of the adjudicatory hearing.2 94 The court also authorized a
change in the procedure for post-dispositional hearings on revocation of
community control.2 95
111. CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES AND FAMILIES IN NEED OF SERVICES

The legislature also moved part IV of chapter 39 entitled "Children in
Need of Services and Families in Need of Services" ("CINS/FINS") to
chapter 984, also within the title governing "Criminal Procedure and
Corrections., 296 This change was also supported by the Juvenile Justice
Advisory Board. 297 Part of the justification appears to be that the
CINS/FINS section of the law should be placed within the corrections title
because DJJ is responsible for the juvenile justice continuum which includes
Children in Need of Services. 298 That public policy justification is contrary
to the view of the federal government and other public policy analysts that
children in need of services legislation should not be part of a juvenile
delinquency continuum.299
The legislature also made substantive changes in the CINS/FINS
statute.300 The law now provides that children adjudicated in need of
services may be placed for up to ninety days in a staff secure facility. 301 A
child found in direct or indirect contempt of court as in need of services who
has run away from staff secure facilities on at least two occasions may be

294. See In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 684 So. 2d 756,
761D6 (1996).
295. Iad at 7671358; see also FLA- R. Juv. P. 8.120.
296. FLA. STAT. § 984.04 (1997).
297. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Juv. Just. HB 1369 (1997) Final Research Doe. at 7 (Apr. 4,
1997).
298. See id Prior to 1994, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)
had the sole responsibility for implementing the provisions of Chapter 39. However, the 1994
legislature eliminated HRS authority to administer certain juvenile justice programs by creating
the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) [Ch. 9413209, Laws of Florida]. As a result of this
change, DJJ is now responsible for the juvenile justice continuum which includes delinquent
children, CINS, and FINS HRS's successor, the Department of Children and Family Services,
continues to be responsible for the child welfare system, including dependency, foster care, and
termination of parental rights. Id.
299. See Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601B5785;
MARK I. SOLER ET AL., REPRESETImG TE CHMD CLIENT 5-12 ( Matthew -ender, 1997); Institute
For Judicial Administration, American -ar Association, Juvenile Justice Standards Project,
Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior 35 (1980).
300. See generally FA. STAT. § 97.280 (1997).
301. FLA. STAT. § 39.4421 (1997) (recodified at§ 984.225 (1997)).
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placed in a physically secure facility. 30 2 The child's parent, guardian 3 or
legal custodian may now file a Child in Need of Services Petition.k
Finally, in addition to other sanctions for contempt of court, the court may
direct the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to withhold
issuance of or suspend a child's driver license or driving privilege for up to
one year for a first offense and up to two years for a second offense of
contempt of court as a CINS. 0 4
IV. DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A.

Dependency Issues

Evidentiary issues tend to be generic in nature and, as such, are beyond
the scope of this survey. However, occasionally an evidentiary issue relates
specifically to the child welfare area. Such was the case in M.B. v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services.30 5 In M.B., the trial court
concluded that the child was dependent based upon the finding that the
father had sexually abused her, and the mother was negligent in failing to
protect the child from the abuse.

°6

The basis for the lower court's finding was prior hearsay statements
which the child later recanted at trial.3 °7 The court examined the Florida
Evidence Code and determined that once the child recanted the identification
at her father's trial, her earlier unsworn statement became a prior
inconsistent statement which was then inadmissible as substantive evidence
at the dependency proceeding.308
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed.
The court held that the
admission and subsequent consideration of the child's statements as
substantive evidence by the fact finder did not require that the child's
3
testimony
trial be consistent
with the
court statements.
found no atconsistency
requirement
in out
theofstatute
which dealt The
withcourt
the

302. FLA. STAT. § 39.4422 (1997) (recodified at § 984.226 (1997)).
303. See FLA. STAT. § 39.436 (renumbered as 984.15).
304. FLA. STAT. § 39.0145(4)(d) (1995).
305. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1817 (1st Dist. Ct. App., Aug. 13, 1996), quashed 22 Fla. L.
Weekly S295 (May 29, 1997).
306. M.B., 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1817.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1 (citing Williams v. State, 560 So. 2d 1304, 1306 (Fla 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990); Jaggers v. State, 536 So. 2d 321, 325 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
309. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. M.-., 22 Fla. L. Weekly S295
(May 29, 1997).
310. Id. at S297.
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admission into evidence of out of court statements of a child crime victim.311
The court explained that the purpose of the law was to deal with problems
inherent in a child victim's live appearance and testimony at trial and to
provide an additional way of presenting a child's evidence to the trier of
fact. 12 The court added that the trial court must also satisfy the stringent
reliability safeguards established in the law.313 Also, the court held that its
1995 decision in State v. Green,314 in which it held that a prior statement of a
child directly conflicting with the victim's trial testimony standing alone
may not sustain a criminal conviction, is distinguishable. 1 5 The court
distinguished Green both on the facts relating to the particular child's
testimony and because Green involved a criminal conviction whereas M.B.
involved a dependency proceeding in which the child's welfare and not
criminal culpability was at issue.316
Interest of rD.,317 is a short opinion worthy of comment because it
clarifies proper appellate practice in dependency cases. 318 In KD., the
appellate court explained the appropriate method of review when an order as
part of a dependency3proceeding requires the return of the child to the
custody of the parent. " Further, the court explained that when a child is
declared dependent and thereafter returned to the custody of the parent, the
trial court retains jurisdiction until the child reaches eighteen
years of age
320
unless jurisdiction is otherwise relinquished by the court.
This is then a
nonfmal order which may be challenged by writ of certiorari and not by
appeal.32'
The question of what parties may intervene in dependency proceedings
was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in J.L. v. G.M. A writ of
certiorari was brought to review two orders of the trial court which allowed
the nonparty maternal grandmother, aunt, and uncle to intervene in an
ongoing dependency proceeding.323 The court relied upon Rule 8.210(a) of
the FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedureand the Supreme Court of Florida's

311. See FLA.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

STAT.

§ 90.803(23) (1996).

M.B., 22 Fla. L. Weekly at S295.
Id at S298.
667 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1995).
MB., 22 Fla. L. Weekly at S298.
Id at S296.
679 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id at39.
Id
Id
Id
687 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id at 977.
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opinion in Beagle v. Beagle,324 to remand the case.325 The Rules of Juvenile
Procedure define parties as "the petitioner, the child, the parent(s), the
department [of Children and Family Services], and the guardian ad litem,
when appointed., 326 The Beagle case establishes Florida's strong public
policy against unwarranted interference with the parenting decisions of an
intact family. 32' The court in J.L. remanded to determine whether the
relatives could be granted nonparty participant status pursuant to Rule
328
8.2 10(b) of the FloridaRules ofJuvenile Procedure.
An important issue of custody in the context of dependency proceedings
arose recently in Roberts v. Florida Department of Children &
Families.329 In that case, the natural father of a six-year-old who had been
adjudicated dependent as to the mother sought release of the child from the
custody of DCF by writ of habeas corpus. 33 The father had been in prison at
the time of the proceeding against the mother and the dependency petition
against him had been dismissed.331 When the father sought return of the
children, the DCF denied him custody.332 Chief Judge Schwartz granted the
writ of habeas corpus and ordered transfer of custody to the child.333 The
court found that there was no evidence that the return would endanger the
safety or well-being of the child which is required under the Florida
statute.334 The court concluded that the DCF lacked authority to make an

324. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
325. J.L., 687 So. 2d at 977-78.
326. Id. at 977.
327. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1271: The issue in -eagle was the ability of grandparents to
enforce visitation rights against an intact family unit in which the parents rejected the visitation.
Id. at 1272.
328. J.L., 687 So. 2d at 978.
329. 687 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
330. Id. at 51.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.at 52.
334. Section 39.41(1) of the FloridaStatutes provides:
When any child is adjudicated by a court to be dependent, and the court finds
that removal of the child from the custody of a parent is necessary, the court
shall first determine whether there is a parent with whom the child was not
residing at the time the events or conditions arose that brought the child
within the jurisdiction of the court who desires to assume custody of the child
and, if such parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the
parent unless it finds that such placement would endanger the safety and
well-being of the child.
FLA. STAT. § 39.41(1) (1995) (emphasis added).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss1/6

30

Dale: Juvenile Law

1997]

Dale

209

independent judicial determination of the best interests of the child. 335 The
statute, according to the336court, represents the legislative policy, and the court
is bound by the statute.
B.

Right to CounselIssues

Florida's dependency statute does not provide an absolute right to
counsel for indigent parents in dependency proceedings. 337 This legislative
failure continues to create problems for the appellate courts. This author has
argued in previous surveys in favor of a statute providing free counsel to
indigent parents in all dependency proceedings as occurs in other states.3 38
The issue came u? again in J.S.S. v. Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services. 9 A father who was denied counsel brought an
appeal which was treated as a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the
failure to appoint counsel. 340 The appellate court found that the procedure
utilized by the trial court in determining whether to appoint counsel
constituted a departure from the essential requirements of law and thus
granted the petition.341 The appellate court's findings and application of law
are probative of need for outright appointment of counsel. First, the trial
court had explained why it had no authority to appoint counsel unless there
was going to be a termination of parental rights proceeding or a pending
criminal proceeding (a clear misunderstanding of the law).342 But in denying
the request, the trial court also explained that it had been at a judicial
conference where it learned that "a couple of judges" had been brought
before the judicial qualifications commission because the judges had been
appointing counsel in dependency proceedings.3 43 The trial court explained
that "[udges are] getting a lot of maybe rightful pressure from taxpayers and

335. Roberts,687 So. 2d at 51.

336. Id at 52. For another state's approach to this matter, see -ennett v. Jeffreys, 356
N.E.2d 277 (1976) and -ennett v. Marrow, 399 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). See also
Rumph v. V.D., 667 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Schwartz, C.J., specially
concurring).
337. See In re D.-., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980); Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 705

(Fla. 1975).
338. See 1996 Survey, supra note 1, at 218; 1994 Survey, supranote 1, at 146.

339. 680 So. 2d 548 (Fla.1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
340. Id at 548.
341. Id at 548-49.

342. Id at 549.
343. Id.
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other powers that be., 344 The appellate court explained that the appointment
of counsel under Florida law takes place when parents are threatened with
permanent loss of custody or when criminal charges may arise from the
proceedings.14' However, in all other proceedings, a case by case
determination of factors contained in the Potvin decision are to be used to
346
The Potvin factors
determine the parents' right to appointment of counsel.
are: "(i) the potential length of parent child separation, (ii) the degree of
parental restrictions on visitation, (iii) the presence or absence of parental
consent, (iv) the presence or absence of disputed facts, and (v) the
complexity of the proceeding in terms of witnesses and documents. 34 The
Potvin test is fact specific and, arguably, mitigates in favor of the
appointment of counsel to indigent parents. However, the statement by the
trial court about the "pressure" being applied does not augur well for
indigent parents who, once there is no appointment of counsel for unstated
political reasons, are usually not in a position to appeal the denial of
counsel. The legislature should set an absolute rule providing counsel to all
indigent parents in dependency cases.
The issue of taxation of costs in dependency cases recently came before
the First District Court of Appeal in W.S.M Jr. v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services.348 After successfully having a petition for
dependency dismissed, a father filed a motion to tax costs against the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS"). The motion was
denied, and the father appealed. 349 Florida law provides in general that in
civil cases a party recovering judgment shall recover all the legal costs and
charges.350 It is irrelevant that the party against whom costs are taxed is a
state agency.35' Several appellate courts have held that the civil taxation
statute applies to juvenile proceedings.3 52 The general rule is that parties are
344. JS.S., 680 So. 2d at 549 The trial court added:I've been told that I better start
following the statute because I, by not following the statute, lose my judicial immunity and I
become a subject of a taxpayer's suit for the dollars that I am appointing attorneys on that do not
meet the requirements of the statute, and I got to sendC marry one daughter and sendC put another
son through college, and I really don't want to lose my judicial immunity. Id.
345. Id. (citing In the Interest of D.F., 622 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
346. Id. (citing In the Interest of D.-., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980)).
347. Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. 1975) (citation omitted).
348. 692 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
349. Id. at 247.
350. See generally FLA. STAT. § 57.041 (1995); Florida -ar v. Davis, 419 So. 2d 325, 328
(Fla. 1982).
351. W.S.M Jr., 692 So. 2d at 247 (citations omitted).
352. See Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. A.F., 528 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Gordon v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 674 So. 2d
840, 841 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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entitled to collect costs in legal proceedings and in equitable proceedings in
the discretion of the court. 353 HRS argued that because the proceedings were
in equity, the court should use discretion and depart from the general rule of
payment.3 54 The court rejected this argument.355 To deny court costs because
of HRS's statutory mandate to prosecute dependency cases would mean
denying the costs across the board in dependency cases.356 In addition, other
courts had already rejected this approach.357 The costs recoverable do not
include court fees or witness fees for certain witness, specifically any party
to the petition, any parent or legal custodian, or child named in a
summons. 358 On the other hand, other witnesses shall be paid the witness fee
fixed by law. 359 With this exception, the court held that the father was
entitled to fees.360
The court's determination as to whether a person is indigent is also
important because it may obligate the parent to find an attorney. 'In
Beveridge v. Mardis,3 6' the trial court, after a cursory examination of the
mother's financial situation, concluded that she was not entitled to appointed
counsel.362 She proceeded pro se and her parental rights were subsequently
terminated despite her ongoing request for an attorney, and the fact that she
could not afford one.363 The appellate court held that the lower court should
have continued the matter until a more thorough investigation of her claim of
indigency and inability to secure counsel could have been
64
conducted.
court
failed toProcedure.26361
obtain a waiver of counsel as
provided
by theFurther,
Floridathe
Rules
of Juvenile
C.

Termination of ParentalRights

Issues of mental illness create difficult problems in termination of
parental rights cases. This was true in P.A. v. Department of Health &

353. W.S.M, Jr., 692 So. 2d at 247 (citing The Florida -ar v. Davis, 419 So. 2d 325, 328
(Fla. 1982).
354. Id at 248.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. W.S.M, Jr., 692 So. 2d at 249 (citing FA. STAT. § 39.414 (1993)).
359. See FtA STAT. § 39.414 (1995).
360. W.S.M Jr., 692 So. 2d at 249.
361. 682 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1996).
362. Id at 1143.
363. Id.

364. Id.
365. Id.; see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320(b)(2) (1996).
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Rehabilitative Services.3 6 6 The trial court had terminated parental rights
based upon the mother's chronic bipolar mental disease. 367 However, the
unrebutted evidence was that the mother had substantially met the four goals
of a performance plan. There was no clear and convincing evidence that she
failed to substantially comply with it. 368 Further, no clear and convincing
36
evidence of past abuse, neglect, or abandonment had been presented.
Other courts in Florida have analyzed the issue of chronic mental illness as a
basis for the termination of parental rights; they have found that it can be the
basis, but only where the parent fails to comply with the performance
agreement and where there was prior abuse, neglect, or abandonment. 3 0 The
appellate court in P.A. held that the DCF cannot simply rely upon the
parents' mental status to terminate parental rights. 37 1 Where the parent and
department enter into a case plan, the DCF must make reasonable efforts to
unify the family; this includes assisting the parent to receive the services
needed to become a capable parent including mental health services.372 The
appellate court therefore reversed, but added that termination could occur if
the parent failed to comply with a new case plan despite reasonable efforts
by the DCF, or if reunification would threaten the children's well-being
irrespective of the provision of services.373
A second case dealing with the difficult issue of mental health services
and compliance with case plans is S.Q. v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services.3 74 The Department moved to terminate parental
rights based upon the claim that the mother failed to obtain timely
psychiatric treatment or counseling for schizophrenia as required by the
permanent placement plan.37 The appellate court rearticulated the Florida
test that termination of parental rights is governed by section
39.467(2)(a)-(k) which sets forth eleven factors. 3 76 The law provides that
366. 685 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
367. Id. at 92.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 92-93.
370. See -.L.H. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 670 So. 2d 1072 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Wiggins v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 616 So. 2d
127 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
371. P.A., 685 So. 2d at 92.
372. Id. at 93 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(e) (1995)).
373. Id.
374. 687 So. 2d 319 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
375. Id.at 323.
376. Id. See T.C. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 681 So. 2d 893, 893
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing at note 1 the issue of whether the trial court must
address in its order each of the factors enumerated in section 39.4612, since renumbered at
section 39.469(3)).
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"[w]hen a petition to terminate parental rights is predicated upon allegations
of abuse, neglect, or abandonment, a performance agreement or permanent
placement plan must be offered [and a parent who fails to] ... 'substantially
comply' with the agreement or plan [may then have parental rights
terminated]."3'77 Parental rights may be terminated so long as failure to
comply with the performance agreement provisions is not the sole basis for
permanently terminating the rights.378 In the S.Q. case, the trial court
incorrectly terminated parental rights based upon the claimed failure of the
mother to comply with recommendations for mental health treatment and
counseling.379 Indeed, none of the psychological tests and evaluations the
mother went through under the performance plan actually recommended
mental health treatment and counseling. 380 Thus, she had no obligation to
undergo them. In addition, the court found that the order terminating
parental rights did not find the factors under the statute proven by clear and
convincing evidence.3 8' The court therefore reversed.3 82

D. Legislative and Rules Changes
The legislature amended the provisions of chapter 39 dealing with
termination when a parent is incarcerated in a state or federal correction
institution. The law now provides for the circumstance when the parent is
expected to be incarcerated for a substantial portion
of the period of time
3 3
8
years.
eighteen
of
age
the
attain
will
child
the
before
In the dependency area, the Supreme Court of Florida authorized
changes in the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure to match case law
determinations over the past few years.38 4 Specifically, the new rules expand
and make precise the procedure for diligent searches and service of
pleadings and papers in dependency proceedings 385 and also change the
procedures for shelter hearings and orders.38 6 Finally, the new rules track
case law with regard to final judgments387terminating parental rights as well as
denying termination of parental rights.

377. S.Q., 687 So. 2d at 323-24 (citation omitted).
378. Id at 324.

379. Id
380. Id at325.
381. Id.
382. S.Q., 687 So. 2d at 325.
383. FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(d)(1) (1997).
384. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 684 So. 2d 756 (1996).

385. Idat769-71.
386. Id at 772-73.
387. Id at 776.
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V. CONCLUSION

The Florida Legislature made extensive structural changes to the
FloridaJuvenile Code in the Juvenile Delinquency and Families in Need of
Services/Child in Need of Services areas this year. The legislative changes
not only move the delinquency and status offense provisions to a new
location in the FloridaStatutes but renumber the provisions. These changes
may result in the additional expenditure of time and money. To what extent
these structural changes will generate new appellate opinions remains to be
seen.
In the meantime, the appellate courts continued a process that has been
going on for sometime-routine correction of basic errors by the trial
courts. However, on occasion the courts, including the Supreme Court of
Florida, have clarified significant issues including evidentiary matters as was
the case in MB. v. Departmentof Health & RehabilitativeServices. 8

388. 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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